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IS BANK PORTFOLIO RISKINESS PROCYCLICAL?
EVIDENCE FROM ITALY USING  A  VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION
Abstract
This study analyzes the cyclical behaviour of the default rates of Italian bank
borrowers over the last two decades. A vector autoregression (VAR) modelling technique is
employed to assess the extent to which macroeconomic shocks affect the banking sector
(first round effect). The VAR also helps to disentangle the feedback effects from the
financial system to the real side of the economy. We find evidence of the first round effect
and some support  for the feedback effect which operates via the bank capital channel.
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1.   Introduction
A large empirical literature has focused on the analysis of the effects of
macroeconomic disturbances on the banking system. In fact, there is an increasing consensus
on the fact that bank fragility is the result of both systemic and idiosyncratic factors. These
studies generally confirm that banks’ balance sheets are affected, simultaneously or with
some delay, by the business cycle. Much less attention has been paid on the possible
feedback effects of bank instability on real economic activity that could amplify the
fluctuations especially during recessions.
This paper is an attempt to analyze both the effects using a vector autoregression
(VAR) approach. With respect to cross-sectional or panel techniques, VAR’s allow to fully
capture the interactions among micro and macroeconomic variables, providing an ideal
framework for financial stability purposes. As in the existing literature, we start with a
simple open economy model in which we introduce the default rate equation to catch the
direct effect of the business cycle on banks’ portfolio riskiness. To evaluate the possible
existence of a feedback effect, we add an equation linking credit supply and bank capital.
This allows us to test whether banks’ portfolio riskiness affects, in turn, the real economy
and the nature of the transmission mechanism. Following the capital crunch hypothesis, we
use some measures of capital adequacy as indicators of banks’ ability to keep sufficient loan
supply in recessionary conditions. The empirical results are quite supportive of both a first
round effect and some feedback effects over the last two decades in the Italian economy.
The estimated relations may be easily employed for carrying out stress testing
exercises, i.e., for assessing the resilience of the banking system in the presence of sudden
unfavorable macroeconomic shocks, thus strengthening supervisory authorities’ capability to
forecast and, possibly, prevent financial crises.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives both the theoretical underpinnings
and the empirical evidence of (pro)cyclicality of banks’ operations previously found in the
literature. Section 3 presents the economic model while Section 4 describes the estimation
method employed and illustrates the empirical evidence on Italian data. Section 5 sketches
some conclusions and directions for further research.4
2.   Cyclicality and procyclicality of banks’ behavior
2.1   Theory...
There are a number of possible explanations to the procyclicality of banks’ behavior:
disaster myopia, over-optimism, herd behaviors, and insufficient market discipline. A
possible pattern is as follows. At the beginning of the expansionary phase, firms’ profits tend
to increase, asset prices rise and customers’ expectations are optimistic. Expansion of
aggregate demand leads to a remarkable growth in bank lending and in economy’s
indebtedness. In such a boom, banks may underestimate their risk exposure and relax their
standards; this process causes the deterioration of borrowers’ creditworthiness. When an
exogenous shock occurs, customers’ profitability worsens and over-optimism is likely to
become over-pessimism which, in turn, can trigger the fall of asset prices that further affects
customers’ financial wealth and depresses the value of collaterals. Furthermore, the rise of
unemployment reduces households’ disposable income and their ability to repay their debts.
An accumulation of non-performing assets tends to emerge and the number of firm failures
increases, causing losses in banks’ balance sheets (cyclicality). We define the impact of the
business cycle on the banking system as the first round effect.
Consequently, banks’ profitability and capital adequacy deteriorate. Banks may, then,
react by tightening credit supply, especially if they have thin capital buffers above the
minimum capital requirement. If banks’ credit can not be easily substituted by other sources
of financing, firms can deal with insufficient funding for their investment projects. This
amplifies the effects of the downturn determining procyclicality. Such feedback from the
banking system to the real economy is the feedback effect.
According to the lending channel theory, reserve requirements on demand deposits
are the main explanation of the role of banks in monetary policy transmission. In fact,
aggregate bank deposit and asset expansions are constrained on the supply side by reserve
requirements. The impact of external disturbances, either real or monetary shocks, is
therefore affected by the level of banks’ reserves.
Moreover, banks deal with another constraint since they have to comply with5
minimum capital requirements
1 (Bliss and Kaufman, 2002). Under a binding risk-based
capital requirement, in normal times, banks can not expand lending without raising
additional capital. Even when the minimum requirement is not binding, a low-capitalized
bank may optimally forgo profitable loans in order to reduce the risk of future capital
inadequacy
2 (Van den Heuvel, 2002). During recessions, loan losses can cause banks to
contract credit supply in order to restore minimum capital ratios in response to the pressure
of the supervisory authorities and the financial markets. If the banking system as a whole has
the excess capital needed to absorb the adverse shocks, the overall effect on bank credit will
be limited and the feedback impact negligible. By contrast, if banks have too thin capital
buffers, they will prefer reducing lending rather than raising capital, which is far more costly
in recessions. The presence of asymmetric information and the lemons problem are
important in explaining why banks prefer contracting credit supply rather than issuing new
equity (Peek and Rosengren, 1995). For this reason, Bernanke and Lown (1991) argue that
the credit crunch should be better named capital crunch since the shortage of equity capital is
the most important factor reducing banks’ ability to lend.
Therefore, the actual relevance of the feedback effect depends on: 1) the role banks
play in firms’ financing; 2) the borrowers’ access to the capital markets (i.e., the degree of
substitutability of loans and bonds); 3) the adequacy of bank capital buffers. These factors
influence the magnitude of banks’ reaction to external shocks and the ability of the
borrowers to find alternative financial sources if banks reduce their credit supply.
In fact, the lending channel is particularly relevant in countries where financial
markets are relatively less developed and firms, especially small and medium-sized ones,
largely depend on banks’ loans. The speed of the transmission mechanism is affected by the
maturity of loans and the nature (fixed/floating) of interest rates: banks that predominantly
lend on a short term basis may change credit policies faster than those with long-term
contracts.
                                                
1 Under 1988 Capital Accord, intermediaries are required to keep a level of capital no less than 8 percent of
their risk-weighted assets (solvency ratio). Banks belonging to banking groups are required to keep a lower
solvency ratio (7 percent) provided that the group is compliant with the 8 percent requirement. In the presence
of provisions against expected losses, supervisory capital should cover unexpected losses. Non-compliant
banks have to meet the regulatory solvency ratio by either raising additional capital or contracting their assets.
2 Banks tend to keep their capital levels above the regulatory minimum to avoid incurring extra costs related
to market discipline and supervisory intervention. For details on the capital buffer theory, see Furfine (2001).6
The decline in banks’ willingness to lend affects bank-dependent borrowers either
reducing financial resources at their disposal or making the cost of external financing higher.
In either case, the net return of investments falls, reducing the demand for investment and
reinforcing the recession. Bank-dependent borrowers may not be rationed, but they are
certain to incur extra costs associated with the search for new lenders and the establishment
of new credit relationships (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). This extra cost is particularly
evident for small and medium-sized firms, where the role of private and soft information is
more important and the costs of acquiring information and monitoring borrowers’ credit
worthiness are larger. The quantitative impact of a reduction in bank loans is however not
certain, since it depends on the size of the credit reduction, on the effects of such reduction
on credit costs, and on the share of output accounted for by bank-dependent firms (Bernanke
and Lown, 1991). This is largely an empirical matter.
2.2   ...and empirical evidence
There is a huge literature supporting the existence of a first round impact from the
economy to the banking sector.
Salas and Saurina (2002) observe that macroeconomic shocks are quickly transmitted
to Spanish banks’ balance sheets. In fact, during economic booms, intermediaries tend to
expand their lending activity, often relaxing their selection criteria. As a consequence, during
downturns, bad loans remarkably increase. Using a panel of Italian banks, Quagliariello
(2004) finds that loan loss provisions and bad debts increase in bad macroeconomic times.
Pesola (2001) shows that the high level of both corporate and households’ indebtedness
along with a GDP growth below the forecasts contributed to the banking crises in the Nordic
countries. Similar evidence is provided in cross-country comparisons by Bikker and Hu
(2002), Laeven and Majoni (2003) and Valckx (2003).
Using aggregated data, Gambera (2000), and Meyer and Yeager (2001) document
that a small number of macroeconomic variables are good predictors for non-performing
loan ratio in the US. Similarly, Hoggarth and Zicchino (2004) provide evidence of a clear
link between the state of the UK business cycle and banks’ write-offs.
Much less effort has been devoted to analyzing the feedback effect from the banking
sector to the real side of the economy. From an empirical perspective, the bank-dependence7
of the non-financial sector is signaled by several factors such as the importance of small
firms and the structure of capital markets.
The evidence on a feedback effect in the US is somewhat mixed. Bernanke and Lown
(1991) agree that credit crunch imposes costs on some borrowers, but do not find any
significant support that it plays a major role in worsening the recessionary conditions.
Conversely, Peek et al. (2003) find that loan supply shocks affect the real macroeconomic
variables and, in particular, those components of GDP more dependent on banks loans, such
as inventories. On the role of bank capital, Peek and Rosengren (1995) show that in the US,
during downturns, poorly capitalized banks tend to shrink credit more than well-capitalized
intermediaries. Similarly, Kishan and Opiela (2000) confirm that the small low-capitalized
banks have the largest response to monetary policy. Bernanke and Lown (1991) document
that the capital constraint leads to unwillingness to lend, while falling capital ratios have a
small but significant impact on banks’ loans, even after controlling for macroeconomic
conditions.
Market financing of the corporate sector is less developed in Europe than in the US
and the effects of a capital crunch might be more pronounced. As reported by Ehrmann et al.
(2001) and Gambacorta (2001), in France, only the largest companies can issue debt
securities. In 1998, bonds represented only 1% of the corporate sector’s total financial
liabilities in Italy and Germany, 4% in France and Spain, 7% in the UK. Accordingly, in
Italy and Germany, the stock market capitalization is rather low. Therefore, European firms
are heavily dependent on banks’ credit to finance their investments.
Table 1 contains some indicators that summarize the role of the banking system as a
source of external financing.
[Insert Table 1 here]
In Italy, the relevance of bank credit as a source of financing for non-financial firms
is witnessed by the share of monetary financial institutions’ (MFI) loans to total lending,
which is higher than the average for the euro area. Further, the weight of bonds with respect
to total liabilities is rather small (1.7% against 8.9% in the euro area). Moreover, the fact that
most borrowers rely on short-term loans suggests that the transmission mechanism may be
relatively rapid. Finally, as far as the structure of the corporate sector is concerned, we note8
that the smallest firms, those with 1-9 employees, represent almost 43% of the total and
absorb more than one-third of total employment.
While Kashyap and Stein (1997) observe that Italy is a country in which the lending
channel is very likely to operate, the existence of a credit channel is well documented for
Italy by Buttiglione and Ferri (1994), Angeloni et al. (1995), Chiades and Gambacorta
(2000), and Gambacorta (2001).
As far as the capital crunch is concerned, analyzing the influence of Italian banks’
capital on the response of lending to monetary and GDP shocks, Gambacorta and Mistrulli
(2003) document that well-capitalized banks are better in shielding their credit supply from
monetary shocks and their lending policies are less procyclical. Moreover, they find that
banks with capital in excess of the regulatory minimum can more easily deal with temporary
borrowers’ difficulties, thus preserving long-term relations.
In sum, while there is a huge and unequivocal empirical support to the existence of a
first round effect, there is much less evidence on the actual relevance of the feedback effect.
3.   The economic model
We assume that the economy is described by the following structural form equation
() tt Ly ε Γ= (1)
where  () L Γ  is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L,  t y  is an  1 n×  data vector, and  t ε
is an  1 n×  vector of structural disturbances. These disturbances are serially uncorrelated and
() t Var ε =Λ , where Λ  is a diagonal matrix with the variances on its main diagonal. We can
thus estimate a reduced-form VAR
() 1 tt t yL y e − =Α + (2)
where  () L Α  is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator  L, and  () t Var e =Σ . Several
identification methods can be used to recover the parameters of the structural-form equation
from the estimated parameters in the reduced-form VAR. The identification schemes under
consideration impose restrictions only on the contemporaneous structural parameters. Letting9
0 Γ  be the matrix of contemporaneous coefficients in the structural form, and  ()
0 L Γ  be the
coefficient matrix in  () L Γ  without the contemporaneous coefficients, we have
() ()
0
0 L L Γ= Γ + Γ (3)
Therefore, the parameters and the residuals in the structural-form equation and those
in the reduced-form equation are related by the following equations
() ()
10
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−− Σ=Γ Λ Γ (5)
In the method proposed by Sims (1980), identification is achieved by Cholesky
decomposition of the reduced-form residuals’ covariance matrix. Consequently,  0 Γ becomes
triangular so that a recursive structure, i.e. the Wold-causal chain, is assumed. In the general
non-recursive modeling strategy suggested by Blanchard and Watson (1986), Bernanke
(1986), and Sims (1986), maximum likelihood estimates of Λ  and  0 Γ  can be obtained only
through the sample estimate  ˆ Σ . The right-hand side of (5) has  () 1 nn +  free parameters to be
estimated. However, since Σ  contains  () 1/ 2 nn +  parameters, even normalizing the n
diagonal elements of  0 Γ  to 1, we need at least  () 1/ 2 nn −  restrictions on  0 Γ  to achieve
identification. In this generalized structural VAR approach,  0 Γ  can be any non-recursive
structure.
For our analysis, we select a recursive identification scheme with a Cholesky
decomposition. As a robustness check we also use the procedure suggested by Pesaran and
Shin (1998), which provides results that do not depend on the ordering of the variables.
3.1   Aggregate Model
Hoggarth and Zicchino (2004) start selecting a narrow set of variables to be included
in their VAR, motivating their choice with the previous literature on reduced-form
macroeconomic models, such as Ball (1998), Blake and Westaway (1996) or Garratt et al.
(2003). Hoggarth and Zicchino (2004) adopt a macroeconomic model enriched with a micro10
equation that describes the behavior of UK banks’ loan write-offs. Loan write-offs are
related to both the real interest rate and the output gap. The other four macroeconomic
relationships consist of an IS curve, a backward looking AS curve which corresponds to a
Phillips curve, an uncovered interest rate parity (UIP), and a modified Taylor rule. Following
this small-scale macroeconomic model, their baseline VAR consists of four macro variables
(output gap, nominal short-term interest rate, real exchange rate and annual inflation rate)
and the micro variable banks’ loan write-offs.
For our baseline VAR we build on a similar small-scale macroeconomic model.
Thus, the baseline VAR includes the following variables: 1) bank borrowers’ default rate, 2)
output gap, 3) inflation rate, 4) three-month interbank interest rate, 5) real exchange rate.
Certainly there are many other potential business cycle indicators, but a preliminary analysis
suggested that the output gap is the most powerful one.
The identification scheme we adopt is recursive. The default rate is assumed to be
contemporaneously exogenous to the output gap and all the other variables included. In the
following, we order contemporaneously exogenous variables first, so that variables at the
front are assumed to affect the following variables contemporaneously, but to be affected by
shocks to the following variables only after a lag. On the other hand, those variables that are
at the end are assumed to affect the preceding variables only after a lag, but are very reactive
to shocks that hit the preceding variables. In the VAR, the financial variables are ordered at
the end, since they respond immediately to shocks to the real side of the economy, whereas
the real variables (default rate and output gap) are ordered at the beginning, because of their
sluggish reaction to financial and monetary shocks. Furthermore, the output gap is ordered
after the default rate reflecting the prior belief that business cycles affect bank losses only
after a substantial lag, as shown by Bikker and Hu (2002), Pain (2003) and Quagliariello
(2004).
We expect the default rate to be negatively affected by the output gap, since good
macroeconomic conditions should make it easier for borrowers to honor their obligations.
Higher interest rates entail an increasing debt burden for banks’ borrowers. The rate of
inflation, which is usually considered a signal of macroeconomic mismanagement and a
source of uncertainty, should exhibit a positive relation with the default rate, even though11
one may also argue that inflation reduces the debt burden in real terms. Finally, we note that
if there is a feedback effect, output gap might, in turn, be affected by a rise in the default
rate.
3.2   Sectoral Models
Along with the aggregate model, we consider two sectoral models, in order to assess
whether, and to what extent, the corporate and household sectors react to different
macroeconomic shocks.
For our corporate specification we include the same aggregate variables of our
baseline model, but for inflation and real exchange rate. In particular, we simply consider a
model with the default rate for the corporate businesses and a measure of financial leverage.
In detail, the corporate model includes the default rate for corporate business, the output gap,
the leverage, and the interest rate, in this exact order. Along with the measure for the general
aggregate activity, we add the level of the interest rates and non-financial firms’ leverage. In
fact, interest rates and indebtedness represent proxies for corporate sector’s financial
fragility. When interest rates are high, firms face greater difficulties in paying their loans
back, especially if they are hugely indebted (Benito et al. 2001).
We also consider a model for the household sector, in which we try to identify the
effects of macroeconomic shocks on households’ default rates. Our VAR model for the
household sector includes five variables: the default rate for the household sector, the output
gap, the ratio of households’ indebtedness to nominal GDP, the annual inflation rate, and the
nominal interest rate. We excluded EXRATE since its impact on households’ default rates
should not be particularly relevant.
As for the corporate sector, the equations try to summarize the effects on the
households’ default rate of the macroeconomic conditions and the corresponding fragility of
the household sector.
3.3   Feedback Model
Finally, to test for the existence of feedback effects, we include in the model a proxy
for bank disposable capital and one for credit supply. With respect to the baseline model, this12
extended specification should be better suited for capturing the potential effects of banks’
behavior on the real sector.
Our preferred proxy for disposable capital is the ratio of negative free capital to
supervisory capital, where the free capital is the share of capital free from fixed assets (total
supervisory capital minus net bad loans, real and financial fixed assets), and indicate if banks
have adequate capital buffers for undertaking new investments. We prefer this variable to
excess capital, i.e., the share of supervisory capital above the minimum regulatory
requirement, since the former is not provided for by banking regulations. Therefore, it should
be less sticky and better able to convey signals on capital constraint.
The spread between the average interest rate on short-term loans and the interest rate
paid by the most creditworthy borrowers (10
th percentile of the distribution of short-term
loans with respect to the interest rate) constitutes a good proxy for the overall credit supply
conditions of the financial system (see Bonaccorsi di Patti et al., 2003). The widening of the
spread should indicate a tightening of credit supply. This variable is thus introduced in the
VAR to analyze the effects of loan market on the real side of the economy. In our view,
credit supply conditions depend on macroeconomic variables as well as on banks’ capital
buffers.
Hence, this model includes the default rate, the output gap, the proxy for bank
disposable capital, the inflation rate, and the proxy for credit supply.
4.   Data and results
With respect to other methods, VAR’s allow us to simulate the response over time of
all the variables included in the system to either a disturbance to itself or to any other
variable. In other words, the fact that all the variables are endogenously determined can be
used to assess the feedback effects of the banking variables on the real economy.13
4.1   Data
In Italy, credit exposures are to be valued at their estimated realizable value. In
particular, bad debts are defined as all exposures to insolvent borrowers, regardless of any
collateral received
3.
Notwithstanding the lack of an objective definition of bad loans, Italian banks tend to
correctly classify their exposures with appropriate timing (Moody’s 2003), making them a
good ex-post indicator of the riskiness of banks’ debtors. Since the stock indicators for bank
riskiness are typically too sticky to promptly reflect the evolution of the business cycle, we
use a flow measure, i.e., the ratio of the amount of loans classified as bad debts in the
reference quarter to the performing loans outstanding at the end of the previous one. This
ratio can be interpreted as a default rate.
For each variable, Table 2 provides a description of the variables, the method
adopted for their computation, the sample availability, and their source. The top panel shows
the microeconomic variables, while the bottom panel gives the macroeconomic ones.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Table 3 provides some descriptive statistics of all the variables andtheir correlations.
Some comments are needed for the correlations. All default rates are significantly
highly correlated, with an almost unity correlation between ADR and ADR_C. This is not
surprising since performing loans granted to the corporate sector represent more than 85% of
total debts with peaks of 95% at the beginning of our sample. The alternative output gap
measures are significantly correlated each other, with a higher correlation between GAP_T
and the others.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Figure 1 depicts the main variables used in our analyses.  The behavior of GAP
provides a reliable picture of the evolution of the business cycle in Italy. It identifies four
main downturns: in the aftermath of the European Monetary System crisis in 1992-93; in
                                                
3 A borrower is considered insolvent if she is globally unable to cover her financial obligations and is not
expected to recover, even if it does not necessarily result in legally ascertained bankruptcy.14
1996 and 1999; and since end-2001. The plots of interest rate and spread confirm the
severity of the 1992-1993 recession. In particular, the dramatic increase of the spread
suggests that banks contracted their credit supply.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The negative trend of interest rates and inflation since the mid-nineties witnesses the
efforts of Italy in order to comply with the Maastricht Treaty provisions.
As far as the default rate is concerned, we note that the indicator tends to follow a
cyclical pattern, but it is also affected by bank-specific factors. For instance, the peak in
1993-1994 is clearly the outcome of the unfavorable economic conditions, but the peak in
1995 reflects the crisis of the Southern banking system. Furthermore, we observe that in
2001 and 2002, despite the severe downturn, the default rate does not show any significant
increase. In principle, the default rate series may show a seasonal pattern since banks tend to
revise their evaluation on loan quality mainly at the year-end. However, we note that
seasonal-adjusted series are very similar to the non-adjusted ones and the correlation is close
to unity. Furthermore, the raw series does not present any particular seasonal patterns over
the years and, therefore, we prefer using raw data
4.
The ratio of negative free capital to supervisory capital seems to be led mostly by
bank-specific factors. For instance, the increase of the indicator in the second half of the
nineties is the consequence of the remarkable expansion of financial fixed assets, due to the
consolidation process of the Italian banking system.
To understand the statistical properties of the variables used in the present paper, and
to characterize the nature of their trend and cycle components, a series of unit root tests are
conducted (table 3). First of all, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test with a constant
and with constant and trend, together with the Phillips-Perron (PP) test for the null of non-
stationarity are employed
5. We use a lag length of five quarters for the ADF tests and a
bandwidth of eight quarters for the PP tests. The ADF test with constant rejects the null of
non-stationarity only for GAP_HP, while the ADF test with constant and trend rejects the
null of a unit root only for GAP at a significance level of 5%. The PP test rejects the null of
non-stationarity only for all the default rates and for EXCRATIO at 5%.15
Since these tests are generally unable to distinguish clearly between integrated and
highly autocorrelated series, and have low power in small samples, their results must be
interpreted in the light of economic theory. To gain additional insights, the KPSS test is also
computed. This test swaps the roles of the null and the alternative hypotheses in such a way
that the null of stationarity is tested
6.
The KPSS tests for both level and trend stationarity fail to reject the null of
stationarity for all the series. Therefore, in the following analysis, the variables included in
the VAR are all in levels, also because we are interested in tracing out their comovements
and interrelationships, and this would somehow be biased, if first differences were adopted
(Enders, 1995).
To take into account either structural breaks in the default rate series or particular
events, we also introduce some intercept dummies. In both the baseline and the feedback
models, we add two dummy variables: one for the fourth quarter of 1995, and the other for
the period from the first quarter of 2001 to the first quarter of 2004. For the corporate sector,
along with these dummies, we also include a dummy for the third quarter of 1991. Finally,
for the household model, we only introduce a dummy for the first quarter of 2002.
All the dummies correspond to peaks of the default rate, generally due to specific
factors or events. The dummy 2001:I-2004:I tries to control for a possible structural break in
the default rate series. In fact, since 2001 credit quality seems to be, ceteris paribus, better
than in the past, probably as a consequence of the adoption of more severe credit standards
                                                                                                                                                      
4 The results provided in the following sections are generally robust to seasonal-adjustments.
5 This set of tests is not reported and the table is available from the authors upon request.
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and more sophisticated risk management techniques. The dummy also controls for the
introduction of the European single currency.
4.2   Empirical Evidence from VARs
4.2.1   Baseline models
The sample for the baseline VAR covers the period 1990:I-2004:I. We start with a
reasonably general lag structure and select the most parsimonious specification according to
several information criteria. The left panel of Table 4 summarizes the results for lag
selection. Several information criteria are reported, together with the sequential likelihood
ratio test and the final prediction error. Numbers in boldface indicate the minimum along
each column and, accordingly, select the lag to be chosen. Among the different criteria, we
concentrate our attention to the Schwartz (SC) and to the Hannan and Quinn (HQ)
Information Criteria. We do not consider the sequential likelihood ratio test because, in
general, one can not control for the overall size of this test. The final prediction error is more
important when a researcher is interested in forecasting, whereas the Akaike information
criterion (AIC) is well known to be extremely insensitive to the addition of more lags which
are not sufficiently penalized. Most criteria suggest a very parsimonious representation. We
adopt the lag structure consistent with the Schwarz criterion and choose one as the optimal
number of lags. This is consistent with previous works on quarterly data (Hoggarth and
Zicchino, 2004).
[Insert Table 4 here]
Preliminary indications on the interactions among the variables are provided by the
results of the Granger pairwise causality tests. The p-values for these tests are reported in the
right panel of Table 4. Apart from the real exchange rate, all the other variables help to
predict the default rate at the 5% significance level. By contrast, there is no evidence of the
existence of a feedback effect from the banking system to the real economy, since ADR does
not help to predict the output gap at usual significance levels.
When estimating a reduced-form VAR, the error term can be interpreted as surprise
movements in each variable after taking its past values into account. If the different variables
in the model are correlated with each other, then the error terms are likely to be also17
correlated across equations. On the other hand, if reduced-form residuals show a low degree
of correlation across equations, then the ordering of the variables becomes almost
unimportant and, therefore, they get close to the structural shocks. This seems to happen in
our baseline VAR, where the highest correlations among the residuals are those between
INFL and GAP, and INFL and REXR
7.
Table 5 shows the percentage of the variance of the error made in forecasting a
variable due to a specific shock at a given horizon. Looking at the variance decomposition of
ADR and GAP, we can see that at twelfth-quarter horizon, less than 5% of the error in the
forecast of ADR can be attributed to GAP. The output gap seems to be a highly persistent
variable since twelve quarters ahead only 20% of the error in its forecast is due to all the
other variables in the system. Most importantly, we can hardly attribute to ADR 2% of the
error in the forecast of GAP at the same horizon.
[Insert Table 5 here]
The impulse response functions provide a more detailed picture of the dynamics of
the variables. Figure 2 shows the impulse responses of each variable to one standard
deviation shocks of the others.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
The response of the default rate to a positive one-standard deviation shock of the
output gap is significant in the subsequent four quarters. This means that in expansionary
phases the default rate tends to diminish and the effect lasts for almost one year. The
responses are similar in magnitude in all quarters. The cumulative impact is about –0.05. As
expected, the rise of interest rates increases the probability that borrowers become insolvent
and the effect of this shock is significant and very persistent (6 quarters). The same holds
also for the inflation rate.
The evidence provided so far is very supportive of the hypothesis that the default rate
follows the business cycle. To assess the robustness of our results, we re-estimate the
baseline model in two ways: i) we extend the sample by including the period 1985-1989,
where, since the default rate is available only on an annual frequency, quarterly data are
                                                
7 Residual correlations are not reported. The tables are available upon request.18
interpolated
8. ii) We use different indicators of the phase of the business cycle, including the
output gap computed as deviations from its trend (GAP_T) and from the Hodrick-Prescott
filtered series (GAP_HP).
The first robustness check consists in re-estimating the baseline VAR over the period
1985:I-2004:I. Overall the previous findings still hold. GAP does Granger cause ADR at 5%
significance level, together with R3M. The correlations between reduced-form residuals
show that now only the linear relationship between INFL and REXR is quite strong,
suggesting that variable ordering might not be an issue here. Regarding the variance
decomposition, at twelfth-quarter horizon, more than 16% of the error in the forecast of
ADR can now be attributed to GAP, whereas at the same horizon 8% of the error of GAP is
attributable to ADR.
Figure 3 depicts the impulse response functions for the VAR with longer sample.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
The impulse responses confirm the main findings of the previous model, even though
the response of ADR to inflation is no longer significant. The response of ADR to output gap
is conversely much more persistent (7 quarters). The response of the output gap to a positive
shock in the default rate goes in the expected direction, but it is not significant.
We also compared our starting results with those obtained using alternative business
cycle indicators. Many results from previous models still hold. When GAP_HP is employed,
the lag length selected by the Schwartz criterion is 1, and all the variables in the ADR
equation do Granger cause the dependent variable, except the annual inflation rate. The
residuals show the highest correlations not only between INFL and REXR, but also between
ADR and GAP_HP. At twelfth-quarter horizon, 15% of the error in the forecast of ADR can
be attributed to GAP_HP, whilst at the same horizon almost 12% of the error of GAP_HP is
attributable to ADR
9.
                                                
8 Data are interpolated by calculating the average weight of each quarterly datum on the corresponding year,
for the sample period where quarterly data are available (1990:I-2004:I). Then, the final quarterly weight
applied to annual data before 1990:I is the average of the weights over each single quarter for the sample
1990:I-2004:I.
9 The tables of the variance decomposition for the robustness models are not reported. They are available
upon request.19
As far as GAP_T is concerned, the selected lag is still 1, and both GAP_T and R3M
do Granger cause the default rate. In addition, the residuals show the highest correlations
between INFL and REXR, and also between ADR and GAP_T. At twelfth-quarter horizon,
14% of the error in the forecast of ADR can be attributed to GAP_T, but at the same horizon
only 3% of the error of GAP_T is attributable to ADR. Since in the ADR equations both
indicators do Granger cause the dependent variable at any conventional level of significance,
our results on the cyclicality of the Italian default rate seem to be robust to different
specifications. The relative impulse response functions are illustrated in Figure 4.
Figure 4 compares the impulse responses of the default rate to shocks to the different
measures of the output gap. The impulse response of ADR to the corresponding measure of
output gap is significant for 4 quarters. Therefore, even with different measures of the output
gap the previous results are still valid.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
As a further robustness check, along with the standard IRF’s computed with the
Cholesky decomposition, we also use the responses calculated using the procedure suggested
by Pesaran and Shin (1998), which gives results that are independent on the order of the
variables. In all cases, the response of ADR to a shock to the real economy is significantly
negative, at least for the first few quarters.
4.2.2   Corporate model
Table 6 and 7 report the results for the Corporate Sector VAR.
[Insert Table 6 and 7 here]
The lag length selected by SC and HQ is 1. Both GAP and LEVERAGE do Granger
cause ADR_C, confirming the findings for other countries in the literature. The only residual
correlation with a high value is the one between R3M and LEVERAGE. At the twelfth
quarter ahead, only 5% of the error in the forecast of ADR can be linked to GAP, whereas at
the same horizon ADR_C takes only into account 8% of the error in the forecasts of GAP
(Table 7).20
The impulse response functions for this model are plotted in Figure 5. They clearly
show that a positive shock on GAP has a significant negative impact on ADR for the
subsequent 4 quarters and such an impact does not significantly vary across quarters.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
Furthermore, the response of ADR to LEVERAGE is positive and very persistent. By
contrast, the interest rate level does not appear to be very significant, confirming the results
of Granger causality.
4.2.3   Household model
Table 8 and 9 illustrate the results from the household VAR. The Schwarz and HQ
information criteria advise to employ one lag.
[Insert Table 8 and 9 here]
The Granger causality tests shows that, as expected, the default rate for the household
sector is Granger caused by the output gap, the level of indebtedness and the inflation rate.
The residuals are not highly correlated, but for the relationship between INFL and GAP,
indicating that the ordering might not be an issue here. Twelve quarters ahead only 9% of the
error in the forecast of the default rate can be attributed to GAP, while ADR_H explains only
1% of the error in the forecast of the output gap (Table 9).
However, looking at the impulse response functions in Figure 6, we note a puzzling
result for the ratio of households’ financial debts to GDP. A positive shock on the latter
negatively affects the former. This outcome seems to indicate that increasing levels of debt
reduce the default rate, which is counterintuitive. We believe that such result is due to the
indicator, which is probably a rough proxy for indebtedness. Indeed, there is not clear-cut
evidence on the expected effects of this variable (see also Salas and Saurina, 2002, and Pain,
2003). The response of ADR to GAP is significant for the first four quarters and the impact
is particularly large in the second and the third quarters.
[Insert Figure 6 here]21
4.2.4   Is there a feedback effect?
The results obtained in the previous paragraphs are very supportive of the idea that
the default rate is cyclical, i.e., that banks’ portfolio quality tends to deteriorate during
downturns. By contrast, we did not find any significant evidence of procyclicality, i.e., of a
feedback effect from the banking sector to the real economy.
In this section, we explore the issue of procyclicality by discussing our VAR model
that explicitly takes into account the variables that may act as a transmission mechanism of
the feedback effect.
Table 10 gives the results of the lag selection criteria and Granger causality tests for
this reduced-form VAR. According to the Schwarz information criterion, we include one lag
of the selected variables. Also, the table provides the results of the Granger causality tests.
The output gap does Granger cause ADR at 10% significance level. In addition, INFL and
SPREAD help to predict ADR at the usual significance levels. More interestingly, there
seems to be a significant feedback effect as witnessed by the fact that ADR and SPREAD do
Granger cause GAP. Unfortunately, our findings do not document a relevant role of capital
buffers in the transmission mechanism. The residuals are not highly correlated, but for the
relationship between INFL and GAP, and that of SPREAD and GAP, indicating that the
ordering might not be an issue here.
[Insert Table 10 here]
Tables 11 reports the variance decomposition for the feedback model. Twelve
quarters ahead, only 8% of the error in the forecast of the default rate can be attributed to
GAP, while ADR_H explains only 2% of the error in the forecast of the output gap.
Moreover, at the same horizon only 1% of the forecast error in NEG_CAP can be attributed
to ADR, while almost 9% of the error in SPREAD is explained by NEG_CAP. Eventually,
SPREAD explains more than 12% of the forecast error of GAP three years ahead. These
results give substantial evidence of a feedback effect.
[Insert Table 11 here]
The impulse response functions depicted in Figure 7 partially confirm the results of
the Granger causality tests. There is still clear evidence of a first round effect and some
signals that a feedback mechanism operates at least in the first two quarters. In particular, we22
do not find evidence of a direct effect of ADR on NEG_CAP, which is not surprising if
banks are able to cover loan losses using profits, without depleting their capital.
Furthermore, the response of SPREAD to NEG_CAP shows that credit supply is also
partially affected by capital constraints and the significant reaction of the output gap to
SPREAD confirms that the contraction of loan supply may reinforce the recessionary
conditions.
[Insert Figure 7 here]
5.   Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to shed some light on relation between business cycle and
banks’ behavior for the Italian banking system. Previous studies mainly focused on the issue
of cyclicality of banks operations, whereas the analysis of the feedback effect has been
largely neglected so far.
We employ a reduced-form VAR to assess the relevance of both the effect of the
business cycle on banks’ borrowers default rates and the possible impact of bank problems
on the real economy. The VAR systems allow to fully capture the interactions among the
relevant variables and to analyze their simultaneous responses to shocks of different nature.
Following the existing literature, we start with a simple open economy model in
which we introduce the default rate equation to capture the effect of the economy on credit
quality. Then, following the capital crunch hypothesis, we add an equation linking credit
supply and bank capital to test whether the deterioration of credit quality affects, in turn, the
real economy.
We find a rather convincing evidence on the first round effect and some support to
the idea that a feedback effect operates via the bank capital channel.
In particular, our results confirm that the default rates follow a cyclical pattern. They
fall in good macroeconomic times and increase during downturns. This evidence is robust to
different measures of the output gap and holds for the household and corporate sectors as
well as for the non-financial sector as a whole. Furthermore, our findings seem to suggest
that, when capital surpluses over regulatory minimum are low, banks may reduce lending,
which, in turn, negatively affects the output levels.23
Although based on a relatively short time period and a single country, our results
confirm the importance for banks to keep sufficient capital buffers in order to maintain an
adequate credit supply also during contractions, thus reducing the possibility of
procyclicality.24
References
Andrews D. W. K. (1991), “Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance
Matrix Estimation”, Econometrica, 60, 953-966.
Angeloni I., L. Buttiglione, G. Ferri and E. Gaiotti (1995), “The Credit Channel of Monetary
Policy across Heterogeneous Banks: The Case of Italy”, Banca d’Italia – Temi di
discussione, n. 256.
Ball L. (1998), “Policy rules for open economies”, NBER Working paper, n. 6760.
Benito A., J. Whitley and G. Young (2001), “Analysing corporate and household sector
balance sheets”, Bank of England - Financial Stability Review, 11, December, 160-
174.
Bernanke B. (1986), “Alternative explanations of the money-income correlation”, Carnegie-
Rochester Series on Public Policy, 25, 49-99.
Bernanke B. and C. S. Lown (1991), “The credit crunch”, Brooking Papers on Economic
Activity, 2, 205-247.
Bernanke B. S. and M. Gertler (1995), “Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of
Monetary Policy Transmission”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 4, 27-48.
Bikker J. A. and H. Hu (2002), “Cyclical Patterns in Profits, Provisioning and Lending of
Banks”, DNB Staff Reports, 86, Amsterdam.
Blake A. P. and P. F. Westaway (1996), “Credibility and the effectiveness of inflation
targeting regimes”, The Manchester School Supplement, 64, 28-50.
Blanchard O.J. and M. W. Watson (1986), “Are business cycles all alike?”, In: Gordon, R.
(Ed.), The American Business Cycle: Continuity and Change. University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, pp. 123-156.
Bliss R. R. and G. G. Kaufman (2002), “Bank Procyclicality, Credit Crunches, and
Asymmetric Monetary Policy Effects: A Unifying Model”, Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, Working Paper, 2002-18.
Bonaccorsi di Patti E., E. Gaiotti and F. Lotti (2004), “Andamento dei prestiti bancari e
indicatori delle condizioni di offerta del credito in Italia, 1992-2002”, Bank of Italy,
mimeo.
Buttiglione L. and G. Ferri (1994), “Monetary Policy Transmission via Lending Rates in
Italy: Any Lessons from Recent Experience?”, Banca d'Italia, Temi di Discussione,
224.25
Chiades P. and L. Gambacorta (2000), “La crediti view in economia aperta: un’applicazione
al caso italiano”, Banca d'Italia – Temi di discussione, 388.
Ehrmann M., L. Gambacorta, J. Martinez Pagés, P. Sevestre and A. Worms (2001),
“Financial Systems and the Role of Banks in Monetary Policy Transmission in the
Euro Area”, in Angeloni I., Kashyap A. and Mojon B., Monetary Policy Transmission
in the Euro Area, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Enders W. (1995), Applied Econometrics – Time Series, John Wiley & Sons, New York.
Furfine C. (2001), “Bank Portfolio Allocation: The Impact of Capital Requirements,
Regulatory Monitoring and Economic Conditions”, Journal of Financial Services
Research, 20, 33-56.
Gambacorta L. (2001), “Bank Specific Characteristics and Monetary Policy Transmission:
the Case of Italy”, Banca d'Italia – Temi di discussione, 430.
Gambacorta L. and P. E. Mistrulli (2003), “Bank capital and lending behaviour: empirical
evidence for Italy”, Banca d'Italia – Temi di discussione, 486.
Gambera M., (2000), “Simple Forecasts of Bank Loan Quality in the Business Cycle”,
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Supervision and Regulation Department, Emerging
Issues Series, S&R-2000-3, Chicago.
Garratt A., K. Lee, M. H. Pesaran and Y. Shin (2003), “A long run structural
macroeconomic model of the UK economy”, Economic Journal, 113, 412-55.
Hoggarth G. and L. Zicchino (2004), “Macro Stress Testing UK Banks”, Bank of England,
mimeo.
Kashyap A. K. and J. C. Stein (1997), “The role of banks in monetary policy: A survey with
implications for the European monetary union”, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago -
Economic Perspective, September/October, 2-18.
Kishan R. P. and T. P. Opiela (2000), “Bank Size, Bank Capital, and the Bank Lending
Channel”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 32(1), February, 121-141.
Kwiatkowski D., P.C.B. Phillips, P. Schmidt and Y. Shin (1992), “Testing the Null
Hypothesis of Stationarity against the Alternative of a Unit Root”, Journal of
Econometrics, 54, 159-178.
Laeven L. and G. Majoni (2003), “Loan Loss Provisioning and Economic Slowdowns: Too
Much, Too Late?”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 12(2), 178-197.26
Meyer A. P. and T. J. Yeager (2001), “Are small Rural Banks Vulnerable to Local Economic
Downturns?”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, St. Louis, March-April, 25-
38.
Moody’s Investor Service (2003), “Non-Performing Loans And Loan-Loss Provisioning
Policies In Various European Countries”, London, October.
Pain D. (2003), “The provisioning experience of the major UK banks: a small panel
investigation”, Bank of England Working Paper, 177, London.
Peek J. and E. S. Rosengren (1995), “The Capital Crunch: Neither a Borrower nor a Lender”,
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 27(3), August, 625-638.
Peek J. E. S. Rosengren and G. M. B. Tootel (2003), “Identifying the Macroeconomic Effect
of Loan Supply Shocks”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 35(6), December,
931-965.
Pesaran M.H. and Y. Shin (1998), “Generalized Impulse Response Analysis in Linear
Multivariate Models”, Economic Letters, 58, 17-29.
Pesola J. (2001), “The role of macroeconomic shocks in banking crises”, Bank of Finland
Discussion Papers, 6, Helsinki.
Quagliariello M. (2004), “Banks’ performance over the business cycle: a panel analysis on
Italian intermediaries”, University of York – Discussion Papers in Economics, 17/04.
Salas V. and J. Saurina (2002), “Credit risk in two institutional settings: Spanish commercial
and saving banks”, Journal of Financial Services Research, 22(3), December, 203-
224.
Sims C. A. (1980), “Macroeconomics and Reality”, Econometrica, 48, 1-48.
Sims C. A. (1986), “Are forecasting models usable for policy analysis?” Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 10, 2-16.
Stock J. H. (1990), “Unit Roots, Structural Breaks, and Trends”, in R. F. Engle and D. L.
McFadden (eds.), Handbook of Econometrics, vol. IV, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Valckx N. (2003), “What determines loan loss provisioning in the EU?”, ECB, mimeo.
Van den Heuvel S. J. (2002), “Does Bank Capital Matter for Monetary Transmission?”,
Federal reserve Board New York – Economic Policy Review, May, 259-265.27
Table 1: The importance of the credit channel











Italy 22.0 57.7 1.7 42.9 34.8
France 7.3 30.1 16.3 42.5 22.9
Germany 22.9 28.8 2.6 53.0 24.0
Spain 15.1 35.1 3.5 n.a. n.a.
UK n.a. n.a. n.a. 31.4 16.9
Euro Area 19.7 37.6 8.9 n.a. n.a.
Notes: (1) Financing of non financial corporations; end-2000; source ECB, Report on financial structures, 2002. (2) Small firms are those with 1-9 employees;
end-1996 for Italy, France and Spain, end-1997 for Germany and the UK; source Eurostat, Enterprises in Europe, 2001.28
Table 2: Data Description
Name Description  Formula   Sample   Source
Microeconomic Variables           
ADR Default Rate (Amount) 100*[Flow of New Bad Debts (t)] / [Performing Loans (t-1)] 1985:I-2004:I Credit Register
ADR_C Default Rate for the Corporate Sector 100*[Flow of New Bad Debts for Coporate Sector (t)] / [Performing Loans (t-1)] 1990:I-2004:I Credit Register
ADR_H Default Rate for the Households Sector 100*[Flow of New Bad Debts for Household Sector (t)] / [Performing Loans (t-1)] 1990:I-2004:I Credit Register
NEG_CAP Disposable Capital ([Negative Free Capital] / [Total Supervisory Capital])*100 1985:I-2004:I Supervisory Reports
Macroeconomic Variables           
GAP Output Gap from Bank of Italy - Quarterly
Model (BIQM) ([Actual Output] / [Potential Output]-1)*100 1985:I-2004:I R.D. database
GAP_HP Output Gap as Deviations of GDP from HP
filtered series [Actual Output] - [HP-filtered series] 1985:I-2004:I -
GAP_T Output Gap as Deviations of GDP from a
trend [Actual Output] – [Trend] 1985:I-2004:I -
INFL Annual Inflation rate 100*(CPI(t)-CPI(t-4)) / CPI(t-4) 1985:I-2004:I R.D. database
R3M Three Month Interbank interest rate 1985:I-2004:I
REXR Real exchange rate [Real Exchange Rate Index]/100 1985:I-2004:I R.D. database
SPREAD Spread [Average interest rate on short-term loans] - [minimum interest rate on short term
loans (10th percentile)] 1989:I-2004:I R.D. database
LEVERAGE Firms' leverage Debt / ([Equity Capital]+Debt) 1990:I-2004:I Financial accounts
DEBT_H Households' indebtedness   [Household Indebtedness] / GDP   1989:I-2004:I   Financial accounts
Notes: Actual Output is the Italian nominal GDP at constant market prices. The data are seasonally adjusted and corrected for the number of working days. CPI is the Consumer Price
General Index (year base 1995). The Real Exchange Rate Index is an indicator of competitiveness with respect to 25 countries. Such indicator is a weighted average of bilateral exchange
rates evaluated at a common currency.29
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
  ADR ADR_C ADR_H GAP GAP_HP GAP_T INFL R3M SPREAD REXR LEVERAGE DEBT_H NEG_CAP
 Mean 0.531 0.722 0.832 0.998 0.000 0.196 3.670 7.376 2.697 1.053 47.706 14.642 7.064
 Median 0.504 0.656 0.884 0.706 0.108 0.078 2.832 7.219 2.629 1.037 48.948 13.202 5.381
 Maximum 1.121 1.444 1.545 11.250 1.627 3.743 6.730 16.500 4.306 1.209 57.818 20.223 16.308
 Minimum 0.217 0.322 0.243 -5.232 -2.331 -2.594 1.297 2.078 1.990 0.881 34.244 11.986 1.317
 Std. Dev. 0.227 0.295 0.352 3.674 0.928 1.538 1.621 3.793 0.425 0.080 7.144 2.397 4.612
 Skewness 0.720 0.774 -0.197 0.647 -0.327 0.469 0.439 0.262 1.135 0.581 -0.296 0.850 0.674
 Kurtosis 2.771 2.777 1.944 3.442 2.386 2.708 1.839 1.925 5.231 2.676 1.688 2.265 2.079
 Jarque-Bera 5.054 5.813 3.019 4.439 1.913 2.292 5.034 3.395 24.051 3.457 4.926 8.150 6.327
p-value (0.080) (0.055) (0.221) (0.109) (0.384) (0.318) (0.081) (0.183) (0.000) (0.178) (0.085) (0.017) (0.042)
 Observations 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
KPSS Level 0.293 0.360 0.387 0.457 0.133 0.024 0.174 0.300 0.420 0.311 0.438 0.123 0.171
KPSS Trend 0.095 0.036 0.066 0.021 0.074 0.025 0.045 0.109 0.056 0.109 0.117 0.099 0.056
                      
Correlations ADR ADR_C ADR_H GAP GAP_HP GAP_T INFL R3M SPREAD REXR LEVERAGE DEBT_H NEG_CAP
ADR 1* ** * * * * * *
ADR_C 0 . 9 9 1* ** * *** * *
ADR_H 0.80 0.81 1 * * * * * * * *
GAP 0.52 0.50 0.57 1 * * * * * * * * *
GAP_HP -0.46 -0.46 -0.39 0.31 1 * * *
GAP_T -0.10 -0.11 0.00 0.70 0.80 1
INFL 0.66 0.58 0.39 0.56 -0.08 0.17 1 * * * *
R3M 0.74 0.66 0.64 0.72 -0.18 0.26 0.81 1 * * *
SPREAD 0.66 0.61 0.67 0.45 -0.50 -0.08 0.50 0.80 1 * *
REXR -0.26 -0.27 -0.22 -0.35 -0.11 -0.17 -0.25 -0.10 0.12 1
LEVERAGE 0.80 0.75 0.67 0.48 -0.46 -0.15 0.78 0.86 0.80 -0.06 1 *
DEBT_H -0.74 -0.73 -0.85 -0.81 0.21 -0.26 -0.46 -0.77 -0.73 0.24 -0.70 1 *
NEG_CAP 0.12 0.16 0.35 0.33 0.23 0.15 -0.12 0.08 0.11 -0.15 0.06 -0.43 1
Notes: The sample is 1990:I-2004:I. KPSS is the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (1992) test for the null hypothesis of stationarity. The
numbers in boldface for the KPSS tests represent those tests which are not significant at 5%. The 5% critical values of the KPSS tests are 0.463 and
0.146 for the level and the trend version respectively. A ‘*’ indicates those correlation coefficients that are significant at 5%.30
Table 4: Lag Selection and Granger Causality for Baseline VAR. Sample 1990:I-2004:I
Lag Length Selection   Granger pairwise Causality tests
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ Dependent Variable in Regression (Regressand)
0 -212.60 NA 2.02E-03 7.99 8.52 8.19 Regressor ADR GAP INFL R3M REXR
1 41.40 436.70 6.61E-07 -0.05 1.38 0.51 ADR 0.13 0.42 0.33 0.67
2 79.52 58.85 4.31E-07 -0.51 1.82 0.40 GAP 0.00 0.09 0.88 0.14
3 97.67 24.84 5.88E-07 -0.27 2.96 0.98 INFL 0.05 0.41 0.03 0.10
4 134.53 43.97 4.42E-07 -0.69 3.44 0.92 R3M 0.00 0.02 0.62 0.01
5 154.58 20.40 6.56E-07 -0.51 4.51 1.44 REXR 0.06 0.22 0.04 0.71
6 183.61 24.45 8.12E-07 -0.65 5.26 1.65  All 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.01
Notes: In the lag selection table (left panel), the numbers in boldface select the best model according to the criterion in each column.  LR is the sequential likelihood ratio test,
FPE is the final prediction error, AIC, SC and HQ are the Akaike, Bayesian Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria respectively.  In the Granger-causality tests (right
panel), the p-values in boldface represent the regressors (or row variables) that help to predict each regressand in the column at 5%.31
Table 5: Variance Decomposition for Baseline VAR
Baseline VAR: 1990.1-2004.1
 Variance Decomposition of ADR:    Variance Decomposition of GAP:
Period S.E. ADR GAP INFL R3M REXR Period S.E. ADR GAP INFL R3M REXR
1 0.117 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 0.686 0.465 99.535 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (3.324) (3.324) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
4 0.144 68.396 4.163 9.610 15.789 2.041 4 1.326 1.224 91.232 1.109 4.459 1.975
(8.944) (3.221) (6.043) (6.896) (2.225) (5.985) (8.464) (2.189) (4.511) (2.053)
8 0.160 56.396 3.864 16.058 21.003 2.679 8 1.676 1.076 82.943 2.424 5.814 7.743
(11.740) (3.567) (9.888) (10.222) (3.704) (5.649) (12.147) (5.314) (8.581) (6.609)
12 0.168 51.668 4.173 20.040 20.692 3.426 12 1.791 0.960 78.670 2.569 5.273 12.528
 (13.190) (3.561) (12.023) (11.784) (5.150)    (5.154) (14.323) (7.519) (10.104) (9.568)
 Variance Decomposition of INFL:  Variance Decomposition of R3M:
Period S.E. ADR GAP INFL R3M REXR Period S.E. ADR GAP INFL R3M REXR
1 0.346 0.070 6.297 93.633 0.000 0.000 1 0.886 0.115 0.343 1.600 97.941 0.000
(3.266) (5.427) (5.930) (0.000) (0.000) (2.299) (2.513) (5.115) (6.298) (0.000)
4 0.713 1.519 14.539 80.540 0.347 3.054 4 1.454 1.465 3.233 13.004 82.059 0.240
(5.136) (9.152) (9.457) (2.792) (2.464) (4.476) (3.952) (10.306) (11.289) (1.419)
8 0.989 1.302 22.056 66.451 0.574 9.617 8 1.819 1.669 12.290 26.512 57.024 2.505
(5.287) (12.813) (13.946) (6.157) (6.498) (4.969) (8.566) (14.954) (15.444) (4.380)
12 1.137 1.189 24.349 58.520 0.503 15.439 12 2.116 1.479 18.720 30.662 42.294 6.846
  (5.387) (13.849) (15.711) (7.799) (9.376)    (5.075) (11.004) (16.487) (16.513) (7.118)
 Variance Decomposition of REXR:
Period S.E. ADR GAP INFL R3M REXR
1 0.027 1.013 0.908 10.088 0.718 87.272
(3.336) (3.029) (6.714) (2.212) (7.897)
4 0.046 1.876 1.925 4.738 15.588 75.873
(6.210) (2.585) (5.219) (9.220) (11.623)
8 0.058 2.062 7.514 3.459 32.379 54.585
(6.305) (6.093) (6.101) (14.284) (13.689)
12 0.064 2.082 10.832 3.211 37.885 45.990
   (6.087) (8.326) (7.708) (15.808) (13.461)
                        
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.32
Table 6: Lag Selection and Granger Causality for Corporate VAR. Sample 1990:I-2004:I
Lag Length Selection   Granger pairwise Causality tests
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ Dependent Variable in Regression (Regressand)
0 -328.68 NA 8.73E+00 13.52 14.12 13.75 Regressor ADR_C GAP LEVERAGE R3M
1 -158.36 287.21 2.07E-02 7.46 8.68 7.93 ADR_C 0.06 0.41 0.23
2 -142.35 24.48 2.13E-02 7.46 9.28 8.16 GAP 0.00 0.50 0.05
3 -129.35 17.84 2.52E-02 7.58 10.01 8.51 LEVERAGE 0.00 0.92 0.05
4 -118.52 13.16 3.37E-02 7.79 10.82 8.94 R3M 0.57 0.13 0.09
5 -104.80 14.53 4.26E-02 7.87 11.51 9.26
6 -75.37 26.54 3.14E-02 7.35 11.59 8.97  All 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.03
Notes: In the lag selection table (left panel), the numbers in boldface select the best model according to the criterion in each column.  LR is the sequential likelihood ratio
test, FPE is the final prediction error, AIC, SC and HQ are the Akaike, Bayesian Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria respectively.  In the Granger-causality
tests (right panel), the p-values in boldface represent the regressors (or row variables) that help to predict each regressand in the column at 5%.33
Table 7: Variance Decomposition for Corporate VAR
Corporate Sector VAR: 1990.1-2004.1
 Variance Decomposition of ADR_C:    Variance Decomposition of GAP:
 Period S.E. ADR_C GAP LEVERAGE R3M  Period S.E. ADR_C GAP LEVERAGE R3M
1 0.155 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 0.714 0.219 99.781 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (2.153) (2.153) (0.000) (0.000)
4 0.169 85.492 4.120 8.365 2.023 4 1.326 6.588 89.422 0.022 3.968
(5.074) (2.872) (3.765) (3.471) (7.441) (9.980) (1.059) (5.401)
8 0.184 74.409 3.931 15.376 6.283 8 1.586 8.412 82.725 0.016 8.847
(7.414) (2.730) (6.667) (6.466) (8.837) (14.749) (3.043) (10.144)
12 0.194 67.235 4.964 19.762 8.039 12 1.652 8.844 80.204 0.015 10.937
   (9.172) (3.146) (8.616) (8.535)    (8.793) (16.537) (5.153) (11.915)
 Variance Decomposition of LEVERAGE:  Variance Decomposition of R3M:
 Period S.E. ADR_C GAP LEVERAGE R3M  Period S.E. ADR_C GAP LEVERAGE R3M
1 1.209 1.021 2.116 96.863 0.000 1 0.899 0.555 0.952 3.877 94.617
(4.021) (5.119) (6.540) (0.000) (2.984) (3.565) (4.741) (6.142)
4 2.427 3.380 5.270 87.115 4.235 4 1.432 3.108 8.790 10.012 78.090
(6.240) (7.734) (9.196) (6.043) (6.067) (7.872) (7.243) (11.114)
8 3.442 2.977 13.157 76.627 7.239 8 1.714 2.299 22.489 15.553 59.659
(6.395) (11.441) (12.757) (10.988) (5.600) (12.495) (9.887) (15.335)
12 4.198 2.225 21.212 69.548 7.014 12 1.904 1.919 30.600 18.876 48.604
   (6.032) (13.731) (14.241) (12.544)    (5.332) (13.930) (11.501) (16.617)
                     
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.34
Table 8: Lag Selection and Granger Causality for Household VAR. Sample 1990:I-2004:I
Lag Length Selection   Granger pairwise Causality tests
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ Dependent Variable in Regression (Regressand)
0 -349.92 NA 9.28E-01 14.11 14.49 14.26 Regressor ADR_H GAP DEBT_H INFL R3M
1 -82.34 461.71 6.92E-05 4.60 5.93 5.11 ADR_H 0.62 0.64 0.41 0.91
2 -55.19 41.53 6.59E-05 4.52 6.79 5.39 GAP 0.00 0.93 0.01 0.48
3 -21.63 44.74 5.14E-05 4.18 7.40 5.41 DEBT_H 0.00 0.10 0.13 0.73
4 1.80 26.65 6.48E-05 4.24 8.41 5.84 INFL 0.01 0.24 0.90 0.13
5 29.89 26.44 7.73E-05 4.12 9.24 6.08 R3M 0.26 0.03 0.07 0.83 
6 64.30 25.64 8.79E-05 3.75 9.81 6.07 All 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.09
Notes: In the lag selection table (left panel), the numbers in boldface select the best model according to the criterion in each column.  LR is the sequential likelihood
ratio test, FPE is the final prediction error, AIC, SC and HQ are the Akaike, Bayesian Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria respectively.  In the Granger-
causality tests (right panel), the p-values in boldface represent the regressors (or row variables) that help to predict each regressand in the column at 5%.35
Table 9: Variance Decomposition for Household VAR
Household Sector VAR: 1990.1-2004.1
 Variance Decomposition of ADR_H:    Variance Decomposition of GAP:
Period S.E. ADR_H GAP DEBT_H INFL R3M Period S.E. ADR_H GAP DEBT_H INFL R3M
1 0.148 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 0.749 0.715 99.285 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (3.508) (3.508) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
4 0.176 71.622 10.672 13.054 2.839 1.813 4 1.311 1.048 88.584 1.456 0.767 8.145
(7.409) (4.514) (3.766) (2.805) (1.994) (4.671) (9.510) (1.820) (2.044) (6.857)
8 0.196 58.352 9.850 17.732 4.141 9.925 8 1.601 0.941 75.851 6.334 1.395 15.479
(9.009) (4.216) (6.107) (5.385) (8.049) (4.237) (15.326) (6.043) (4.532) (12.017)
12 0.213 50.270 9.192 19.214 6.540 14.784 12 1.726 0.962 68.782 12.980 1.670 15.606
   (9.671) (4.159) (8.043) (8.015) (11.561)     (4.066) (16.951) (10.185) (6.470) (12.806)
 Variance Decomposition of DEBT_H:  Variance Decomposition of INFL:
Period S.E. ADR_H GAP DEBT_H INFL R3M Period S.E. ADR_H GAP DEBT_H INFL R3M
1 0.206 0.011 0.041 99.948 0.000 0.000 1 0.351 3.120 10.281 0.109 86.491 0.000
(2.169) (1.890) (2.950) (0.000) (0.000) (3.885) (7.072) (2.038) (7.497) (0.000)
4 0.421 1.002 0.126 92.594 0.490 5.788 4 0.671 5.663 23.798 0.812 69.590 0.137
(3.299) (3.217) (7.385) (1.581) (6.135) (6.921) (10.936) (2.081) (11.997) (2.750)
8 0.635 2.238 1.234 79.094 3.151 14.283 8 0.893 5.142 34.067 0.952 57.352 2.487
(4.463) (5.621) (13.891) (5.302) (13.471) (6.766) (13.795) (2.405) (13.556) (7.300)
12 0.829 3.428 4.399 67.632 7.346 17.194 12 1.017 4.543 37.925 0.803 50.242 6.487
   (5.269) (8.882) (17.522) (9.254) (16.615)     (6.346) (14.724) (2.952) (13.917) (11.347)
 Variance Decomposition of R3M:
Period S.E. ADR_H GAP DEBT_H INFL R3M
1 0.905 3.354 0.441 0.044 1.186 94.974
(5.775) (2.945) (2.281) (3.308) (6.952)
4 1.459 4.264 4.983 0.091 7.099 83.564
(6.418) (6.302) (2.127) (7.386) (10.528)
8 1.764 5.301 15.454 0.188 15.368 63.689
(6.318) (10.727) (2.630) (11.683) (14.732)
12 1.981 5.466 23.730 0.500 19.633 50.672
   (5.947) (12.514) (3.587) (13.654) (16.204)
                         
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.36
Table 10: Lag Selection and Granger Causality for Feedback VAR. Sample 1990:I-2004:I
Lag Length Selection   Granger pairwise Causality tests
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ Dependent Variable in Regression (Regressand)
0 -322.37 NA 1.46E-01 12.27 12.82 12.48 Regressor ADR GAP NEG_CAP INFL SPREAD
1 -124.96 337.40 2.80E-04 6.00 7.46 6.56 ADR 0.02 0.72 0.56 0.98
2 -101.50 35.83 3.07E-04 6.05 8.43 6.97 GAP 0.12 0.97 0.02 0.51
3 -79.73 29.29 3.74E-04 6.17 9.46 7.44 NEG_CAP 0.76 0.17 0.00 0.55
4 -53.99 29.96 4.22E-04 6.14 10.34 7.77 INFL 0.03 0.38 0.77 0.25
5 -23.99 29.45 4.52E-04 5.96 11.07 7.94 SPREAD 0.01 0.01 0.97 0.46
6 25.51 39.60 2.79E-04 5.07 11.09 7.40 All 0.00 0.02 0.97 0.01 0.63
Notes: In the lag selection table (left panel), the numbers in boldface select the best model according to the criterion in each column.  LR is the sequential likelihood ratio test,
FPE is the final prediction error, AIC, SC and HQ are the Akaike, Bayesian Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria respectively.  In the Granger-causality tests (right
panel), the p-values in boldface represent the regressors (or row variables) that help to predict each regressand in the column at 5%.37
Table 11: Variance Decomposition for Feedback VAR
Prociclicality VAR: 1990.1-2004.1
 Variance Decomposition of ADR:    Variance Decomposition of GAP:
Period S.E. ADR GAP NEG_CAP INFL SPREAD Period S.E. ADR GAP NEG_CAP INFL SPREAD
1 0.123 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 0.681 0.187 99.813 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (3.218) (3.218) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
4 0.153 71.550 7.376 0.878 4.626 15.570 4 1.344 2.706 82.657 6.398 0.250 7.988
(10.976) (4.810) (2.903) (3.905) (8.048) (7.048) (11.040) (6.208) (1.858) (6.964)
8 0.163 63.218 7.967 1.124 8.323 19.368 8 1.639 2.332 71.771 14.053 0.552 11.291
(13.101) (5.684) (4.342) (6.224) (9.836) (7.807) (15.666) (11.841) (4.012) (10.039)
12 0.167 60.567 7.681 3.206 9.396 19.151 12 1.738 2.092 67.086 17.764 0.793 12.265
   (13.676) (5.462) (6.441) (6.890) (10.035)     (7.813) (17.478) (14.336) (5.457) (11.040)
 Variance Decomposition of NEG_CAP:  Variance Decomposition of INFL:
Period S.E. ADR GAP NEG_CAP INFL SPREAD Period S.E. ADR GAP NEG_CAP INFL SPREAD
1 1.984 0.512 3.468 96.020 0.000 0.000 1 0.330 0.181 8.881 0.835 90.103 0.000
(2.591) (6.136) (6.274) (0.000) (0.000) (3.147) (6.887) (2.915) (7.750) (0.000)
4 3.228 1.348 2.749 95.790 0.071 0.042 4 0.538 0.420 13.279 11.687 73.843 0.771
(6.813) (6.031) (9.292) (1.568) (2.159) (5.817) (8.197) (8.586) (10.382) (2.456)
8 3.698 1.470 2.171 96.034 0.098 0.227 8 0.714 0.449 14.528 35.455 49.030 0.538
(8.150) (6.283) (11.334) (3.538) (3.758) (7.255) (9.806) (15.680) (12.750) (3.659)
12 3.853 1.457 2.027 96.024 0.096 0.395 12 0.838 0.339 14.041 48.141 36.595 0.884
   (8.250) (6.562) (12.228) (4.929) (4.805)     (7.720) (10.246) (17.398) (12.538) (4.462)
 Variance Decomposition of SPREAD:
Period S.E. ADR GAP NEG_CAP INFL SPREAD
1 0.257 2.898 18.426 6.661 0.252 71.762
(4.750) (8.732) (6.229) (1.720) (9.797)
4 0.352 2.806 18.065 9.214 1.346 68.569
(5.646) (8.397) (9.446) (3.790) (10.952)
8 0.368 2.725 17.324 9.210 3.334 67.407
(5.856) (8.401) (10.689) (6.364) (11.535)
12 0.371 2.706 17.043 9.380 4.125 66.746
   (6.102) (8.234) (10.681) (7.179) (11.734)
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NEG_CAP
Notes: The figure depicts all the variables used in the paper and described in Table 2 for the sample 1990:I-
2004:I. For the graph in the middle of the second row, the left-hand scale is referred to GAP_HP, while the
right-hand scale is referred to GAP_T.39
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of REXR to REXR
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Notes: The IRF’s are computed with Cholesky factorization and two standard error bands.40
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of REXR to REXR
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Notes: The IRF’s are computed with Cholesky factorization and two standard error bands.41
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Response of ADR to Cholesky
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of ADR to Generalized One
S.D. GAP_T Innovation
Notes: In the top panel the IRF’s are computed with Cholesky factorization.  The bottom panel depicts the
generalized IRF’s calculated using the procedure by Pesaran and Shin (1998).  In both panels, two standard
error bands are shown.42
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of R3M to R3M
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Notes: The IRF’s are computed with Cholesky factorization and two standard error bands.43
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Response of R3M to R3M
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Notes: The IRF’s are computed with Cholesky factorization and two standard error bands.44
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Response of SPREAD to SPREAD
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Notes: The IRF’s are computed with Cholesky factorization and two standard error bands.